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Good Faith Inquiries Under the Bankruptcy
Code: Treating the Symptom, Not the Cause
In enacting the Bankruptcy Code (the Code),1 Congress delib-
erately eliminated the old Bankruptcy Act's2 requirement that a
petition for reorganization be filed in "good faith."3 Despite this
statutory change, bankruptcy courts continue to explore the mo-
tives of debtors who file voluntary petitions for reorganization.
Some courts have characterized this as "an 'impressive judicial
gloss'" on the Code's statutory filing requirements. While there is
little question that bankruptcy courts have the power to fashion a
good faith requirement,5 an inquiry focusing on the debtor's good
I Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified at 11
U.S.C. §§ 101-151,326 (1982), scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. (1982), and other scattered
sections of the U.S. Code), amended by Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS (98 Stat.) 333.
1 Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (codified as amended at 11
U.S.C. §§ 1-1200 (1976)) (repealed 1978) [hereinafter cited without cross-reference as the
Bankruptcy Act].
3 Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act contained the requirement of good faith in filing.
Bankruptcy Act § 141, 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1976). Although the Code's elimination of this re-
quirement is not discussed expressly in either the House Report, H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963 [hereinafter
cited as HousE REPORT], or the Senate Report, S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978),
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS 5787 [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT],
the commission established by Congress to propose a reformation of national bankruptcy
law specifically recommended removing the good faith requirement, REPORT OF THE COMMIS-
SION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES (pt. 1), H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. 183, 222 n.7 (1973).
4 See In re Levinsky, 23 Bankr. 210, 217 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982) (quoting In re 299
Jack-Hemp Assocs., 20 Bankr. 412, 413 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982)). Commentators have gener-
ally supported the application of a good faith requirement. See, e.g., Di Donato, Good Faith
Reorganization Petitions: The Back Door Lets the Stranger In, 16 CONN. L. REv. 1 (1983);
DiPietro & Katz, Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code-Use or Abuse?, 57 CONN. B.J. 418
(1983); Gaffney, Bankruptcy Petitions Filed in Bad Faith, 12 U.C.C. L.J. 205 (1980); Ordin,
The Good Faith Principle in the Bankruptcy Code: A Case Study, 38 Bus. LAW. 1795
(1983); Note, Good Faith in Chapter Eleven Reorganization, 35 S.C.L. REv. 333 (1984).
5 Section 305 of the Code allows the court to dismiss or suspend a case where it would
be in "the interests of creditors and the debtor" to do so, or where "there is pending a
foreign proceeding." 11 U.S.C. § 305(a) (1982). Section 1334 of title 28 (formerly section
1471 of title 28), which gives the district courts jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases, also al-
lows the district or bankruptcy court to "abstain[] from hearing a particular proceeding
arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under title 11." 28 U.S.C.A. § 1334(c)
(West Supp. 1985). A decision by a trial court abstaining under either section 1334 or sec-
tion 305 is not reviewable on appeal. 11 U.S.C. § 305(c) (1982).
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faith ignores the cause of the creditor's complaint: either the lack
of "adequate protection"" or the inappropriate use of bank-
ruptcy-an essentially procedural legal forum-to alter the appli-
Most cases involving a good faith inquiry under the Code have been initiated by se-
cured creditors under 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(d) (West 1979 & Supp. 1985) requesting relief from
the automatic stay. See, e.g., Myers v. The Beach Club (In re Beach Club), 22 Bankr. 597,
599 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1982); Central Bank v. Zed, Inc. (In re Zed, Inc.), 20 Bankr. 462, 462
(Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1982); Provident Bank v. BBT (In re BBT), 11 Bankr. 224, 227 (Bankr.
D. Nev. 1981).
Sections 362(d) and 1112(b) both require a showing of "cause" before relief may be
granted. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(d)(1) (West 1979 & Supp. 1985) ("On request of a party in
interest ... the court shall grant relief from the stay ... for cause, including the lack of
adequate protection .... "); id. § 1112(b) ("[O]n request of a party in interest .... the
court may convert a case under this chapter to a case under chapter 7 [liquidation] or may
dismiss a case under this chapter .... for cause .... "). The legislative history of both
provisions states that the standards for determining "cause" were intentionally left open-
ended. With respect to section 362(d), the definition of "cause" is open-ended in two ways.
First, by way of a general statement that "[t]he lack of adequate protection of an interest in
property. . . is one cause for relief, but it is not the only cause." HOUSE REPORT, supra note
3, at 343, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. N.ws at 6300; SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 52,
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5838. Second, by way of an open-ended definition of
adequate protection itself:
[S]ection [361] specifies ... means of providing adequate protection. They are neither
exclusive nor exhaustive. . . . The section does not specify how value is to be deter-
mined, nor . . . when it is to be determined. These matters are left to case-by-case
interpretation and development. It is expected that courts will apply the concept in
light of the facts of each case and general equitable principles.
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 339, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6295; see also In
re Alyucan Interstate Corp., 12 Bankr. 803, 805 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981); 2 COLLIER ON BANK-
RUPTCY § 361.01[1] (L. King 15th ed. 1985).
The legislative history of section 1112(b) also embraces an expansive definition of
"cause." See HousE REPORT, supra note 3, at 406, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6362
("[The list in section 1112(b)] is not exhaustive. The court will be able to consider other
factors as they arise, and to use its equitable powers to reach an appropriate result in indi-
vidual cases."); SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 117, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
5903 (same). Courts have interpreted the "equitable" and "case-by-case" language in the
definition of "cause" as an invitation to reinstate the good faith requirement. A similar ap-
proach characterizes their view of the sections allowing them to stay their jurisdiction:
courts applying section 305 or 28 U.S.C.A. § 1334(c) (West Supp. 1985) usually do so in
combination with other sections of the Code. See, e.g., In re Coram Graphic Arts, 11 Bankr.
641, 643, 645-46 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981) (§§ 105, 305, and 1112(b)); In re Victory Constr.
Co., 9 Bankr. 549, 559-60 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1981) (§ 362(d) and 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (1982)
(currently 28 U.S.C.A. § 1334 (West Supp. 1985)).
One court based the good faith requirement on section 1129(a)(3). See Connell v.
Coastal Cable T.V., Inc. (In re Coastal Cable T.V., Inc.), 709 F.2d 762, 764 (1st Cir. 1983).
This approach was also adopted by the court in In re Madison Hotel Assocs., 29 Bankr.
1003, 109-10 (W.D. Wis. 1983), but the decision was reversed for failure to make the "legal
distinction between the good faith that is required to confirm a plan under section
1129(a)(3) and the good faith that has been established as a prerequisite to filing a Chapter
11 petition for reorganization." In re Madison Hotel Assocs., 749 F.2d 410, 425 (7th Cir.
1984) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
For a discussion of adequate protection, see infra note 59 & notes 82-97 and accom-
panying text.
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cable substantive rules.7
Courts created the good faith requirement in cases where cred-
itors raised one of two objections: that the debtor filed the petition
"solely" in order to forestall the collection efforts of secured credi-
tors8 or that the debtor entity was created immediately prior to the
filing of the petition in order to place assets of the party creating
the debtor beyond the reach of creditors.9 These seemingly unre-
lated cases are united by a common thread: Despite the fact that
the creditor's complaint takes the form of a "good faith" objection,
the problem is not the debtor's subjective intent; rather, it is the
courts' practice of failing to give secured creditors value equivalent
to what they would have received in the absence of a bankruptcy
proceeding.
This failure by bankruptcy courts to give secured creditors
equivalent value-the "adequate protection" required by the
Code10-is not limited to those cases addressing the question of
the debtor's good faith.11 The good faith requirement has never-
7 For a discussion of bankruptcy as a collective proceeding, see infra notes 12-28 and
accompanying text.
8 See, e.g., North Cent. Dev. Co. v. Landmark Capital Co. (In re Landmark Capital
Co.), 27 Bankr. 273, 278-79 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1983); Ketchikan Lodge No. 1429, Benevolent &
Protective Order of Elks v. Hewitt (In re Hewitt), 16 Bankr. 973, 976 (Bankr. D. Alaska
1982); Yaffe v. Andrews (In re Andrews), 17 Bankr. 515, 518 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1982); see
also In re Coram Graphic Arts, 11 Bankr. 641, 642 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981) (dismissing peti-
tion sua sponte under §§ 105, 305, and 1112(b) for "unreasonable delay by the debtor that is
prejudicial to creditors").
I Commonly, assets are transferred from an individual or partnership to another entity
immediately before filing. The courts usually have little difficulty finding bad faith in these
cases, with little analysis of whether the transfer even affected the substantive rights of the
creditors. See, e.g., Central Bank v. Zed, Inc. (In re Zed, Inc.), 20 Bankr. 462, 463 (Bankr.
N.D. Cal. 1982); In re Eden Assocs., 13 Bankr. 578, 579-81, 584-85 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981);
Capital Management Co. v. Alison Corp. (In re Alison Corp.), 9 Bankr. 827, 828 (Bankr.
S.D. Cal. 1981); In re Dutch Flat Inv. Co., 6 Bankr. 470, 471 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1980). But
see, e.g., In re Spenard Ventures, Inc., 18 Bankr. 164, 166-67 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1982) (no
bad faith where principal of transferee corporation remained personally liable); Chattanooga
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Northwest Recreational Activities, Inc. (In re Northwest Recrea-
tional Activities, Inc.), 4 Bankr. 36, 37, 42 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980) (no bad faith where the
rights of the creditors were unaffected by the transfer).
A variation on this theme involves the transfer of property from an entity that is ineli-
gible to ifie under the Code to an eligible entity. See, e.g., In re 299 Jack-Hemp Assocs., 20
Bankr. 412, 412 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982); Polkin, Inc. v. Lotus Invs. (In re Lotus Invs.), 16
Bankr. 592, 594-95 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981); In re G-2 Realty Trust, 6 Bankr. 549, 551
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1980); see also In re Dolton Lodge Trust No. 35,188, 22 Bankr. 918, 921
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1982) (no transfer of assets but an attempt to file as a joint venture).
" 11 U.S.C.A. § 361 (West 1979 & Supp. 1985).
'" See, e.g., Crocker Nat'l Bank v. American Mariner Indus. (In re American Mariner
Indus.), 27 Bankr. 1004, 1009 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 734 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1984);
General Elec. Mortgage Corp. v. South Village, Inc. (In re South Village, Inc.) 25 Bankr.
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theless been grafted onto the Code without any attempt to demon-
strate its consistency with the normative underpinnings of bank-
ruptcy law. This failure to give "good faith" a coherent theoretical
framework has had an unfortunate, but not unsurprising, result:
the extension of the inquiry to cases where the core issue is
whether the debtor belongs in a collective proceeding at all. Here
too the malleability of the term "good faith" permits a bankruptcy
judge to pursue a motive-based inquiry based on concepts of "eq-
uity," and to avoid applying a technical statute in a systematic
way.
Part I of this comment describes the creditors' bargain model,
a framework that can be used to bring clarity to this confused area
of bankruptcy law. Part II then examines the kinds of cases in
which the good faith of the debtor has been raised and explores
the courts' reasoning in such cases. Part III demonstrates that the
need for courts to fashion a good faith doctrine has resulted, not
from the bad motives of debtors seeking to abuse the bankruptcy
process, but rather from the bankruptcy courts' own practice of
failing to grant secured creditors truly adequate protection.
I. THE CREDITORS' BARGAIN MODEL
The purpose of a bankruptcy proceeding is to sort out the
rights of various parties."2 But the only rights involved in a corpo-
rate bankruptcy proceeding are those of persons having an owner-
ship interest in the debtor.13 Any discussion of the "debtor's inter-
987, 990 n.3, 1002 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982); In re Pine Lake Village Apartment Co., 19 Bankr.
819, 824 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982); In re Nixon Mach. Co., 9 Bankr. 316, 317-18 (Bankr. E.D.
Tenn. 1981); Imperial Bank v. El Patio, Ltd. (In re El Patio, Ltd.) 6 Bankr. 518, 522-23
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1980); Nimmer, Secured Creditors and the Automatic Stay: Variable
Bargain Models of Fairness, 68 MINN. L. REv. 1, 12 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Nimmer,
Secured Creditors]; Nimmer, Real Estate Creditors and the Automatic Stay: A Study in
Behavioral Economics, 1983 ARIz. ST. L.J. 281, 285 [hereinafter cited as Nimmer, Real Es-
tate Creditors]; O'Toole, Adequate Protection & Postpetition Interest in Chapter 11 Pro-
ceedings, 56 AM. BANKPI L.J. 251, 263-64 (1982); Comment, Adequate Protection and the
Automatic Stay Under the Bankruptcy Code: Easing Restraints on Debtor Reorganization,
131 U. PA. L. REv. 423, 428 & n.33 (1982).
12 See Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors' Bar-
gain, 91 YALE L.J. 857, 857-58 (1982).
13 See id.; see also Baird & Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of
Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in
Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHL L. REV. 97, 103 (1984). The tendency of courts to encourage reorga-
nizations under chapter 11 demonstrates some judicial concern over the rights of "debtors."
See, e.g., In re Bermec Corp., 445 F.2d 367, 369 (2d Cir. 1971) ("We are conscious of the
deep concern of the manufacturing secured creditors lest their security depreciate beyond
adequate salvage, but we must balance that with the Congressional mandate to encourage
attempts at corporate reorganization where there is a reasonable possibility of success.");
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est" in a corporate bankruptcy proceeding misconceives the nature
of corporations, which are merely legal fictions. Rather, the only
legally cognizable interests in the assets held under the corporate
name are those of various kinds of "owners": secured and un-
secured creditors, and stockholders.14
The basic premise of the creditors' bargain model is that
bankruptcy law should mirror the agreement these owners would
have reached had they bargained among themselves before the
debtor experienced financial difficulties.15 Outside a bankruptcy
proceeding, an unsecured creditor would have to rely on state law
remedies to satisfy its claim in the event of default. An individual
creditor's principal legal remedy against a nonpaying debtor under
state law is to sue the debtor in state court, obtain a judgment
against it, and levy on the debtor's property. 6 The order in which
creditors levy on the property determines the priority of their
rights to proceeds from the sale of the assets. 7 If the debtor is
subject to claims far in excess of its assets, creditors who levy first
will have their claims satisfied in full, while those who come last
will leave empty-handed. Creditors, therefore, closely monitor
debtors and bring suits as soon as debtors experience financial dif-
ficulties.1 8 Since, outside of bankruptcy, creditors have an incentive
to levy on a debtor's assets as soon as possible, a debtor having
difficulty meeting its financial obligations might be quickly and un-
necessarily dismembered by its creditors.
If all the owners could negotiate before the debtor's financial
International Harvester Co. v. Kleinsasser (In re Kleinsasser), 12 Bankr. 452, 455 (Bankr.
D.S.D. 1981) ("[I]t was the intent of Congress ...that a debtor be given one meaningful
opportunity to rehabilitate .... [The automatic stay] provides a debtor a breathing spell
from his creditors to attempt a reorganization."). Whether the concern is over debtors per se
or employees, customers, or trade partners is unclear, but in any event, the practice of en-
couraging reorganizations is highly questionable from a theoretical viewpoint. See Baird,
Corporate Debtors and Bankruptcy Policy, J. LEGAL STm. (forthcoming).
14 See Baird & Jackson, supra note 13, at 105 & n.28.
"' See Jackson, supra note 12, at 859-60.
16 D. BAIRD & T. JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY 3-6
(forthcoming).
17 This applies to unsecured creditors, who must jump through a number of procedural
hoops in order to obtain satisfaction of their claims from the debtor's property. The require-
ments vary from state to state, but usually involve obtaining a lien on specific property and
then levying on that property. See generally D. BAIRD & T. JACKSON, supra note 16, at 6-9;
STEFAN RIESENFELD, CREDroRs' REMEDIES AND DEBTORS' PROTECTION 94-175 (3d ed. 1979).
Secured creditors take security interests in specific assets, the principal advantage of which
is the "priority rights" this gives the secured creditor against competing claims to the asset.
See generally D. BAIRD & T. JACKSON, supra note 16, at 14-15; S. RIESENFELD, supra, at 175-
215.
I" See Jackson, supra note 12, at 862.
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condition weakened, creditors would not agree to the piecemeal
liquidation of the debtor under state law through a series of indi-
vidual suits.19 Rather, they would contract for a collective proceed-
ing for resolving their claims against the estate.2 0 Such a proceed-
ing would offer three benefits to creditors. First, it would reduce
strategic costs because creditors would no longer have to monitor
the debtor to preserve their claims.2 Second, creditors would bene-
fit from the administrative efficiencies that result from a collective
proceeding. Instead of creditors bringing individual suits, all claims
against the debtor would be adjudicated in one proceeding, thus
lowering the costs each creditor must bear.22 Third, and most im-
portant, because a collective proceeding results in an increased
pool of assets for the satisfaction of the creditors' claims. A firm is
often worth more as a gQing concern than it would be if it were
liquidated on a piecemeal basis. A collective proceeding allows the
creditors to keep the debtor's assets intact if such action would
increase their expected total return. 3
Under the creditors' bargain model, federal bankruptcy law
creates a procedural forum that puts the debtor's assets to their
most efficient use. A corollary of the procedural nature of bank-
ruptcy is that the substantive rights of the creditors should be
changed only to the extent necessary to effectuate the collective
proceeding.24 While creditors would agree to a proceeding that in-
creased their expected return, they would not agree to a procedure
that systematically transferred value from one class of owners to
another. Thus, the baseline for a creditor's right inside of bank-
ruptcy is what it would be entitled to have outside of bankruptcy.25
I Id. at 862-64.
20 Id. at 860-71.
21 Id. at 861-64.
22 Id. at .866-67.
23 Id. at 864-66.
24 See Baird & Jackson, supra note 13, at 108 n.40.
21 See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54-56 (1979) (stating that the determina-
tion of property rights inside bankruptcy should be governed by state law rather than by
"undefined considerations of equity"); Baird & Jackson, supra note 13, at 103; Eisenberg,
Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 28 UCLA L. REV. 953, 953-59 (1981); Jackson, supra note
12, at 871; cf. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 105 S. Ct. 1986, 1992
(1985) ("[The proper inquiry is] to consider the roles played by the various actors of a
corporation in bankruptcy to determine which is most analogous to the role played ... [in]
a solvent corporation [outside of bankruptcy]."); Comment, Waiver of the Attorney-Client
Privilege by the Trustee in Bankruptcy, 51 U. CH. L. REv. 1230, 1241-46 (1984) (same). But
see Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 103 (1966) ("There is an overriding considera-
tion that equitable principles govern the exercise of bankruptcy jurisdiction."); SEC v.
United States Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434, 455 (1940) ("A bankruptcy court is
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It might be thought that the inclusion of secured creditors
would alter this theoretical analysis. Because state law guarantees
secured creditors at least the value of their security even in the
event of piecemeal liquidation, they have no interest in seeing that
other creditors receive a larger return. Outside of bankruptcy, the
secured creditor has bargained for a right to seize and sell specific
assets to satisfy its claim against the debtor.2 The secured creditor
differs from the general creditor because the secured creditor con-
tracts with the debtor to receive payment from the sale of specific
assets if the debtor defaults. 7 This right is similar to the general
creditor's right to be paid in full before shareholders receive any
return on their investment. Because the secured creditor is assured
that its claim will be satisfied up to the full value of its security, a
collective proceeding offers it little, if any, additional benefit. Yet
this does not mean that the secured creditor would object to such a
proceeding; if the secured creditor were assured that its recovery
would not be reduced, it would be indifferent to the imposition of a
collective proceeding. And, since general creditors and sharehold-
ers would benefit from a collective proceeding, all parties would
agree to such a system so long as it assured secured creditors the
full value of their claims.
Whether or not secured creditors are in fact entitled to receive
the full value of their claims within bankruptcy is the real issue at
the core of the good faith problem. The creditors' bargain model
suggests that these creditors should receive full value in order to
ensure that they have no disincentive to participate in the collec-
tive proceeding.28 If the bankruptcy process systematically fails to
a court of equity. . . and is guided by equitable doctrines and principles except in so far as
they are inconsistent with the Act.") (citations omitted).
26 See generally U.C.C. art. 9 (1978) (governing rights and duties of parties to secured
transactions).
17 See Baird & Jackson, supra note 13, at 112-14.
'a See Jackson, supra note 12, at 901-06. Professors Baird and Jackson argue that
"[w]ithout being disingenuous, one cannot rely on a provision designed to protect secured
creditors from undercompensation to justify a policy-such as not protecting the time value
of money-that must undercompensate them both in theory and in practice." Baird & Jack-
son, supra note 13, at 129. They argue that requiring time-value compensation is fair be-
cause it makes junior parties pay for the risk of failure where they stand to benefit from the
possibility of success, id. at 100-01, 108-10, and assert that time-value compensation will not
hinder desirable reorganizations, id. at 100-01, 109-10, 118-19 & n.68.
Other commentators disagree with this approach on the ground that the bankruptcy
process encompasses other goals in addition to sorting out nonbankruptcy entitlements.
Professor Nimmer, for example, asserts that giving the secured creditor the time value of
money will defeat too many viable reorganizations, in conflict with a congressional policy of
encouraging reorganizations over liquidations. See Nimmer, Secured Creditors, supra note
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give secured creditors such value, however, debtors have an incen-
tive to enter bankruptcy in order to forestall collection efforts by
secured creditors and thereby gain at the creditors' expense. Se-
cured creditors have a corresponding incentive to keep debtors out
of bankruptcy in order to preserve the value of their claims. Thus,
although the secured creditors' real worry is that they will not be
assured full value in the bankruptcy proceeding, they are forced to
cloak this concern in the guise of an attack on the debtor's mo-
tive-that is, that it lacked "good faith"-in filing the bankruptcy
petition.
II. JUDICIAL IMPOSITION OF A GOOD FAITH REQUIREMENT
The conventional wisdom is that bankruptcy reorganization
has two goals: the promotion of a "fresh start" for debtors and the
equitable resolution of the claims of creditors.29 There is thought
to be an inherent tension between these two goals, and the Code is
viewed as representing a compromise between the interests of
creditors and equity participants.30 From this perspective, bank-
11, at 15. Commentators who argue against time-value compensation usually recognize that
any other policy results in a transfer of wealth from the secured creditor to the debtor. See,
e.g., id. at 9; James & Kirkland, Adequate Protection Through Augmented Interests in
Reorganization Plans, 58 AM. BANKi. L.J. 69, 74 n.27 (1984). Such policies are defended
nonetheless, on the ground that bankruptcy should take account of factors extrinsic to the
instant dispute between the parties, such as the effect a liquidation might have on employ-
ees, the local community, or suppliers. See, e.g., In re Bonded Mailings, Inc., 20 Bankr. 781,
785 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982) ("To dismiss these proceedings would be to throw the instant
debtors to the mercy of the [unsecured creditors'] collection efforts destroying both jobs and
any hope of recovery by the debtors' other unsecured creditors .... ); Comment, supra
note 11, at 427 ("The court should accord weight, not only to the interests of the debtor and
creditor, but also to the interest of the debtor's employees in keeping their jobs; that of the
public in generating tax revenues and avoiding increased unemployment and welfare pay-
ments; that of consumers in maintaining competition in the debtor's industry; and that of
the debtor's suppliers in receiving a reasonable return on their unsecured claims.") (footnote
omitted).
29 See, e.g., Edleman v. Gleason (In re Silver Mill Frozen Foods, Inc.) 23 Bankr. 179,
184 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1982) ("While one of the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code is to
insure a 'fresh start' for debtors, an equally important purpose is to provide for an equitable
distribution of the bankrupt's assets among his creditors.. . ."); Capital Management Co. v.
Alison Corp. (In re Alison Corp.), 9 Bankr. 827, 829 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1981) ("One basic
purpose of the Bankruptcy Code remains... giving the debtor a 'fresh start.'.. . Another
main thrust of the bankruptcy system is... equitable.., distribution to creditors.").
so The clearest illustration of this supposed tension is in the commentary on adequate
protection. See, e.g., Nimmer, Real Estate Creditors, supra note 11, at 284 ("[T]he ade-
quate protection standard mandates a balance between the secured creditor's right to en-
force its bargain and the desirability of [the debtor's] retaining property to achieve broader
bankruptcy objectives."); Comment, supra note 11, at 426 ("[T]he idea of 'adequate protec-
tion' brings the secured creditor's contractual and property rights into direct conflict with
the policy favoring debtor rehabilitation . . ").
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ruptcy is often viewed as a struggle between a piteous debtor and
the cold, though just, demands of creditors.31 Deciding who is enti-
tled to what is considered so difficult that bankruptcy law has had
an unfortunate tendency to fudge the answers. 2
The creditors' bargain model implies that the goal of promot-
ing a debtor's fresh start is meaningless where that debtor is a cor-
poration. The "owners" of a corporation include its creditors, and
they are indifferent to the corporation's continued existence. Their
goal is to obtain the best return on their investment, and a deci-
sion to reorganize implies only that there is a greater expected
value in the corporation's continued existence than in its immedi-
ate liquidation. 3 Yet this model does not describe how judges de-
cide cases. This section of the comment will examine what bank-
ruptcy judges have actually done and will explain how the good
faith inquiry conceals a fundamental failure to understand the re-
quirements of the Code.
The cases fall into three general categories: those involving
transfers of assets to the debtor near the time of the filing of the
petition; those raising the issue of the feasibility of reorganization
and, implicitly, the issue of adequate protection; and those in
which an inquiry into motive masks the basic question of whether
the owners will benefit from a collective proceeding.
B, See Murphy, Restraint and Reimbursement: The Secured Creditor in Reorganiza-
tion and Arrangement Proceedings, 30 Bus. LAw. 15, 16 (1974) ("To a large extent, case law
concerning the restraint of creditors in bankruptcy proceedings has been shaped in ...
cases where the dry property rights of the creditor must be balanced against very human
concerns . . . . It is hardly surprising that the equities are usually balanced against the
secured creditor.").
32 One area where the "tendency to fudge" is repeatedly demonstrated is in the valua-
tion of collateral. See infra notes 94-95 and accompanying text. Another illustration was the
uncertainty of the standards provided under the old Bankruptcy Act for determining which
chapter provided the appropriate proceeding for a given debtor. See House REPORT, supra
note 3, at 223, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 6182-83 ("The establishment of the two
chapters [governing corporate reorganizations was due in large part] to the inability of Con-
gress or the bankruptcy community, both the bar and academia, to decide what it was that
creditors were ultimately entitled to receive: liquidation or going-concern value. They fi-
nessed the issue by the adoption of two chapters."). A third case in point is the treatment of
the legislative history of the Code's standard of adequate protection. Requiring time-value
compensation for secured creditors is consistent with that legislative history and with a the-
oretical understanding of the proper role of bankruptcy; the legislative history, however,
contains enough open-ended language emphasizing the need to "do equity" that one may be
led to conclude that time-value compensation is not required. See infra note 87.
33 See Baird & Jackson, supra note 13, at 109 ("[A] firm should be kept intact only if it
has more value as a going concern than liquidated, because only then will the assets be put
to their highest-valued use.").
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A. Transfers of Assets Immediately Prior to Filing the Petition
A substantial number of good faith cases involve creditors who
challenge bankruptcy petitions because of last-minute asset trans-
fers to the debtor. These cases generally follow one of two patterns.
An example of the first would occur where the trustees of a testa-
mentary trust wish to file a petition for bankruptcy on behalf of
the trust. Under the Code, a bankruptcy court could not entertain
such a petition because nonbusiness trusts are ineligible for a
bankruptcy proceeding.3 4 Unable to file a petition, the trustees
transfer all of the trust's assets and liabilities to a corporation. The
corporation immediately files a bankruptcy petition, and the
trust's secured creditors file a complaint seeking dismissal of the
petition as one that was filed in bad faith."6
An example of the second pattern would occur where an indi-
vidual, who owns a number of assets, faces a foreclosure proceeding
on one of them. He could file a bankruptcy petition on his own
behalf, subjecting all his assets to a bankruptcy proceeding and
perhaps to the control of a trustee;36 the automatic stays7 provision
would then prevent foreclosure. In the alternative, the individual
can create a new corporation, transfer the asset subject to foreclo-
sure to the corporation, and immediately cause the corporation to
file a bankruptcy petition. This process also prevents the secured
creditor from foreclosing on the asset, but without subjecting all of
the individual's other assets to a bankruptcy proceeding. If the
debtor chooses this second option, the secured creditor who initi-
3, Nonbusiness trusts are excluded from the definition of "person" under the Code, 11
U.S.C.A. § 101(33) (West Supp. 1985) ("'person' includes individual, partnership, and cor-
poration"); id. § 101(8) (defining a "corporation" as including only business trusts), and
"only a person ... may be a debtor" under the Code, id. § 109(a).
31 Cases falling within this pattern include In re 299 Jack-Hemp Assocs., 20 Bankr.
412, 412-14 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (transfer of property from a probate estate); Polkin, Inc.
v. Lotus Invs. (In re Lotus Invs.), 16 Bankr. 592, 594-95 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981) (transfer
from an ineligible trust to a corporation); In re G-2 Realty Trust, 6 Bankr. 549, 550-53
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1980) (transfer from an ineligible nominee trust to an eligible business
trust); see also In re Dolton Lodge Trust No. 35,188, 22 Bankr. 918, 921 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1982) (no transfer of assets but an attempt to file as a joint venture). But cf. In re Ponn
Realty Trust, 4 Bankr. 226, 229-31 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1980) (analysis turns on the permissi-
ble uses of chapter 13 and chapter 11: "under the proper circumstances, a business trust
such as a realty trust with transferrable [sic] shares may be a proper debtor under Chapter
11").
., 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1104, 1302 (West 1979 & Supp. 1985). The filing of a petition for
bankruptcy creates an "estate," which includes "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor
in property." Id. § 541(a)(1). Section 363 of the Code limits the use, sale, and lease of the
property in the estate by the trustee. Id. § 363.
37 Id. § 362.
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ated the foreclosure proceeding may petition the bankruptcy court
to dismiss the corporation's petition as being filed in bad faith."
Most bankruptcy courts attempt to handle such situations
through an inquiry into the debtor's good faith. Ordinarily, how-
ever, they offer no justification for the inquiry; instead, they
merely assert that the inquiry should be undertaken,39 even though
the good faith requirement for the filing of a petition is not ex-
pressed in the Code itself.40 One attempt at a justification was of-
fered by the court in In re Victory Construction Co.41 The court
began its analysis by describing the long history of good faith in-
quiries in bankruptcy and concluded that, in light of this tradition,
"[ilt would be more than anomalous to conclude that. . .Congress
[in eliminating the Act's good faith requirement] intended to do
away with a safeguard against abuse and misuse of process which
had been established and accepted as part of bankruptcy philoso-
phy. . . for almost a century. '42
38 Cases falling under this pattern include Meadowbrook Investors v. Thirtieth Place,
Inc. (In re Thirtieth Place, Inc.), 30 Bankr. 503, 504-06 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1983) (applying a
clearly erroneous standard of review to what it characterized as the "factual issue" of
whether the debtor "was created for the predominant purpose of filing in bankruptcy" and
reversing the lower court's determination that the debtor filed in good faith); In re FJD,
Inc., 24 Bankr. 138, 139-41 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1982) (finding lack of good faith in debtor's
transfer of personal residence to a corporation that conducted no business operations while
debtor maintained other property out of corporate solution); Central Bank v. Zed, Inc. (In
re Zed, Inc.), 20 Bankr. 462, 463-64 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1982) (concluding that the purpose of
the transfer was to protect the debtor's other assets, without making clear what guarantees
or recourse were available prior to transfer); In re Eden Assocs., 13 Bankr. 578, 579-81, 584-
85 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) (motion by the debtor to set aside creditor foreclosure sale de-
nied on a theory of equitable estoppel overlaid by a discussion of the debtor's bad faith in
having conducted a series of unrecorded transfers); Capital Management Co. v. Alison Corp.
(In re Alison Corp.), 9 Bankr. 827, 828 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1981) (transfer to corporation in
order to protect individual owner's other assets); In re Dutch Flat Inv. Co., 6 Bankr. 470,
471 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1980) (transfer of property in order to avoid submitting the assets of
the corporation's "parent entities").
39 Courts have characterized the nature of this inquiry in several ways, but the one that
is most often relied upon first appeared in Chattanooga Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc. v. North-
west Recreational Activities, Inc. (In re Northwest Recreational Activities, Inc.), 4 Bankr.
36, 39 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980): "Good faith ... is merged into the power of the court to
protect its jurisdictional integrity from schemes of improper petitioners seeking to circum-
vent jurisdictional restrictions and from petitioners with demonstrable frivolous purposes
absent any economic reality." The justification for the doctrine has not been developed
much further than this. Indeed, in Central Bank v. Zed, Inc. (In re Zed, Inc.), 20 Bankr. 462,
463-64 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1982), the court offered no justification at all for the inquiry, and
merely made identical statements under "Findings of Fact" and "Conclusions of Law" that
"[tihe Chapter 11 case was not filed in good faith."
40 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
4, 9 Bankr. 549 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1981).
42 Id. at 558.
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The court analyzed the purposes underlying the bankruptcy
mechanism, noting correctly that bankruptcy proceedings are a
method of preserving the going concern value of the debtor.4" The
court went further, however, and asserted somewhat nebulously
that there are those who wish to use bankruptcy for illegitimate
ends." Although the court did not explain how one should deter-
mine what ends were illegitimate nor why they should be consid-
ered so, it did observe that the good faith and bad faith uses of
bankruptcy met at a borderline, a "borderline ...patrolled by
courts, of equity armed with the doctrine of 'good faith.' -5
In these borderline cases, what passes for analysis of a debtor's
good faith is usually no more than a conclusion. This is well illus-
trated by the opinion in In re G-2 Realty Trust.46 In that case, a
secured creditor gave G-2 Realty, a Massachusetts nominee trust, a
construction loan in return for a mortgage and security interest in
a building leased and owned by G-2 Realty.47 The secured creditor
also received an assignment of the rents from the building as se-
curity for the loan.48 When G-2 Realty defaulted on its payments,
the secured creditor began collecting rents directly from tenants,
took possession of the property, and initiated foreclosure proceed-
ings.49 The beneficiaries of the trust, understanding that a nominee
trust is not a debtor eligible for bankruptcy under the Code,
amended G-2 Realty's declaration of trust to transform G-2 Realty
from a nominee trust to an eligible business trust.50 G-2 Realty
then filed a bankruptcy petition, and the secured creditor brought
an action in the bankruptcy court alleging that the petition was
43 Id.
4 Id.
45 Id. (footnote omitted). In Victory, the court in fact hinted that adequate protection
was the underlying problem in transfer-of-asset cases. Noting that cases questioning the
good faith of debtor filings often were instigated by "entities whose financial interests were
threatened by the delay and expense associated with a [bankruptcy proceeding]," id., the
court implied that at least one cause of good faith challenges was the failure to give parties
to a proceeding value equivalent to what they would have received outside bankruptcy. In
the case of secured creditors, the time value of money must be included before protection
can be deemed adequate. See infra notes 82-97 and accompanying text. The Victory court,
however, fell back on notions of equity in dismissing the petition "independent of the exis-
tence or lack of adequate protection." 9 Bankr. at 560. Behind this holding was the debtor's
attempt to use reorganization as "a vehicle for profit through use of the secured creditors'
collateral at low interest not currently available in the real estate market[]," id. at 565, a
situation that could easily have been remedied by providing time-value compensation.
46 6 Bankr. 549 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1980).
47 Id. at 550.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 550-51.
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filed in bad faith.51 In resolving the dispute the court stated:
[A]n alteration in legal form solely to become eligible as a
debtor under the Code is not, standing alone, sufficient to re-
quire a finding of bad faith. .... Nevertheless, when such a
transformation occurs at or near the time a petition is filed, it
is a significant factor . . . . [T]he Court must satisfy itself
that the debtor demonstrates "exemplary motives and scrupu-
lous good faith" before allowing the debtor to obtain the ben-
efits available under Chapter 11.2
The court then dismissed the petition, accepting the secured credi-
tor's argument that the change in the debtor's form "was accom-
plished not for any legitimate business purpose, but rather to delay
the foreclosure sale and to prevent the [secured creditor] from ex-
ercising its lawful rights."53
This inquiry into the debtor's intent is the typical form that
good faith analysis takes,54 and G-2 Realty shows how pointless it
can be. The good faith inquiry was not based on any interpretation
of the statutory provision at issue. No attempt was made to ex-
plain why the intent of the parties was relevant to resolving the
central questions of how the former nominee trust failed to fit into
the permissible business trust form. No effort was made to deter-
mine whether adequate protection was available to compensate the
secured creditor for foregoing its right to foreclosure. Rather, the
good faith inquiry seems to have been based on a visceral reaction
to certain types of behavior. In fact, the behavior that courts find
distasteful results from infirmities in their own application of
bankruptcy rules. Good faith inquiries paper over these difficulties
5I !d.
52 Id. at 553-54 (citations omitted).
13 Id. at 551.
"This is usually couched in terms of an inquiry into whether the "sole purpose" of the
debtor was to delay creditors. See, e.g., Meadowbrook Investors v. Thirtieth Place, Inc. (In
re Thirtieth Place, Inc.), 30 Bankr. 503, 505-06 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1983); R & M Porter Farms,
Inc. v. Green Hills Prod. Credit Assoc. (In re R & M Porter Farms, Inc.), 38 Bankr. 88, 91
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1984); North Cent. Dev. Co. v. Landmark Capital Co. (In re Landmark
Capital Co.), 27 Bankr. 273, 279 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1983); In re FJD, Inc., 24 Bankr. 138, 141
(Bankr. D. Nev. 1982); In re Mogul, 17 Bankr. 680, 681 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982); In re
Coram Graphic Arts, 11 Bankr. 641, 642 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981); Provident Bank v. BBT
(In re BBT), 11 Bankr. 224, 235 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1981); Capital Management Co. v. Alison
Corp. (In re Alison Corp.), 9 Bankr. 827, 829-30 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1981); In re Victory Con-
str. Co., 9 Bankr. 549, 564-65 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1981); In re Dutch Flat Inv. Co., 6 Bankr.
470, 471 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1980); In re Fast Food Properties, Ltd., 5 Bankr. 539, 540
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1980).
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by resolving disputes without addressing the underlying problem.55
B. Feasibility of Reorganization and the Issue of Adequate
Protection
Courts have also used the good faith inquiry when a secured
creditor raises the issue of the feasibility of reorganization and the
related problem of adequate protection. To illustrate, assume that
a corporation's sole asset is a piece of real estate that has a present
market value of $10,000. The corporation purchased this real es-
tate three years ago with a $10,000 loan from a bank. The real es-
tate secures the bank's loan, which has a six-percent contract rate
of interest, as compared with the present twelve-percent market
rate. During the past three months the corporation has fallen be-
hind on its payments to the bank, and the bank, anxious to rein-
vest its funds at the present rate of interest, initiates a foreclosure
proceeding on the real estate. The corporation responds by filing a
bankruptcy petition seeking a reorganization under chapter 11 of
the Code; this prevents the bank from foreclosing on the collateral
because of the Code's automatic stay provision. The bank makes
a motion in the bankruptcy court for relief from the automatic stay
on the grounds that reorganization is infeasible, it is not receiving
the adequate protection mandated by the Code, and the petition
was filed solely as a bad faith attempt to forestall the foreclosure.57
Courts implementing the adequate protection requirement
have often held that where the value of the collateral is stable, the
secured creditor is not entitled to receive anything further, or that
where the secured creditor is oversecured, payments at the con-
5" In G-2 Realty, as in Victory, the problem underlying the good faith challenge was
one of adequate protection. As the court noted, the change of form from a nominee trust,
ineligible for bankruptcy under the Code, to an eligible business trust could "delay or pre-
vent the imminent foreclosure sale [of the secured party]." G-2 Realty, 6 Bankr. at 554. The
only reason that delay could have been disadvantageous to the secured lender in G-2 Realty
is that the secured party was not receiving the time value of money. By deciding the case
under the good faith analysis, the court avoided addressing this important bankruptcy issue.
Further, in determining whether the secured party is receiving adequate protection, the
debtor's motives for filing the petition are simply irrelevant. Yet, the good faith approach
relies on precisely this factor in resolving the dispute.
5' 11 U.S.C.A. § 362 (West 1979 & Supp. 1985).
57 See, e.g., In re Madison Hotel Assocs., 29 Bankr. 1003, 1010 (W.D. Wis. 1983), rev'd,
749 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1984); North Cent. Dev. Co. v. Landmark Capital Co. (In re
Landmark Capital Co.), 27 Bankr. 273, 276-77 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1983); Yaffe v. Andrews (In
re Andrews), 17 Bankr. 515, 518 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1982); Ketchikan Lodge No. 1429, Benev-
olent & Protective Order of Elks v. Hewitt (In re Hewitt), 16 Bankr. 973, 976 (Bankr. D.
Alaska 1982); Provident Bank v. BBT (In re BBT), 11 Bankr. 224, 228 (Bankr. D. Nev.
1981).
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tract rate of interest under the authority of section 506(b)58 are
sufficient.59 Where the contract rate is less than the prevailing
market rate of interest, debtors have filed petitions to take advan-
tage of this favorable bankruptcy treatment, and courts have re-
sponded by analyzing the cases under the good faith doctrine to
determine whether the "sole purpose" for filing was to preserve the
low interest loan.60 But this intent-based inquiry glosses over the
more important question of precisely what should constitute ade-
quate protection. It also fails to recognize that improper motives
are in fact caused by the courts' improper definition of adequate
protection.
The analysis of the court in Provident Bank v. BBT (In re
BBT)6 1 illustrates these problems. In BBT, the debtor leased box-
cars, a substantial number of which were collateral for secured
loans. After a sudden, dramatic drop in the demand for its boxcars
and ensuing financial difficulty, the debtor filed a petition for reor-
ganization. The secured creditor, who was undersecured for the
amount of its loan to the debtor, challenged the good faith of the
petition, presumably fearing that the amount of its recovery was
likely to decrease in a bankruptcy proceeding. The court viewed
the secured creditor's complaint as a straightforward attack on the
8 1 U.S.C.A. § 506(b) (West 1979 & Supp. 1985).
"This is often characterized as protection arising out of the debtor's "equity cushion."
See, e.g., In re Pine Lake Village Apartment Co., 19 Bankr. 819, 823-28 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1982); Cable Sys., Inc. v. Coors of the Cumberland, Inc. (In re Coors of the Cumberland,
Inc.), 19 Bankr. 313, 321 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1982); Worcester County Nat'l Bank v. Xinde
Int'l, Inc. (In re Xinde Int'l, Inc.), 13 Bankr. 212, 215-16 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981); Crocker
Nat'l Bank v. American Mariner Indus. (In re American Mariner Indus.), 10 Bankr. 711,
712-13 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1981), afi'd, 27 Bankr. 1004 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 734 F.2d
426 (9th Cir. 1984); But see Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Alyucan Interstate Corp. (In re Alyucan
Interstate Corp.), 12 Bankr. 803, 809-12 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981) (generally critical of the
equity-cushion analysis while endorsing a somewhat looser fact-based framework more solic-
itous of the debtor's need for the property in its reorganization). In a variation on this
theme, some courts seek to preserve either the bargained-for debt/equity ratio at the initia-
tion of the loan transaction or a ratio commensurate with commercial realities. See, e.g.,
Ingersoll-Rand Fin. Corp. v. 5-Leaf Clover Corp. (In re 5-Leaf Clover Corp.), 6 Bankr. 463,
466-68 (Bankr. S.D.W. Va. 1980) (requiring payments at the contractual rate and on the
rate of depreciation of the collateral so as to preserve the equity cushion necessary to allow
the creditor a commercially reasonable time in which to dispose of seized property without
loss); Diversified Mortgage Investors v. Lake Tahoe Land Co. (In re Lake Tahoe Land Co.),
5 Bankr. 34, 37 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1980) (requiring equity cushion of 40-50% as commercially
reasonable for undeveloped land).
60 See, e.g., Yaffe v. Andrews (In re Andrews), 17 Bankr. 515, 519 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
1982) (dismissal for bad faith where the court concluded that the debtor's primary purpose
was to take advantage of the contract's 6% interest rate when the current market rate was
18%); In re Victory Constr. Co., 9 Bankr. 549, 564 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1981) (similar).
61 11 Bankr. 224 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1981).
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feasibility of the reorganization and denied the motion to vacate
the stay. 2 Its decision not to lift the automatic stay was based on
the view that "where the value of the collateral is firm, the secured
creditor is adequately protected . . . [so long as] the collateral is
... properly insured, relieved of taxes, and properly main-
tained. '63 In addressing the good faith issue, the court accepted
the dicta of the court in Victory that the resolution of the good
faith issue is independent of the presence or absence of adequate
protection. 4 The court did not, however, explain why the good
faith issue should have arisen at all if there was adequate
protection.
In Yaffe v. Andrews (In re Andrews),65 the debtor held an in-
terest in a beachfront home that secured a loan with an interest
rate that was quite low in light of current market conditions e. 6 The
court dismissed the petition for reorganization, on the ground that
it was filed primarily to preserve the low interest rate: "Accord-
ingly, it is not a proceeding within the contemplation, intent, or
purpose of Chapter 11 of the Code. .. [because the debtor did not
file with] that candor, frankness, sincerity, and willingness to do
equity which are the indicia of 'good faith.' "67 Despite the fact
that it appeared that the debtor could have provided adequate
protection in the form of payments at the current market rate of
interest,68 the court did not consider the possibility of ordering it
to do so. It also completely ignored the relationship between the
good faith issue and the question of whether the creditor could be
guaranteed adequate protection. 9
:2 Id. at 236-37.
3 Id. at 231 (footnote omitted).
64 Id. at 235.
66 17 Bankr. 515 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1982).
60 Id. at 518.
67 Id.
Go The debtor was a partnership, and the general partner had a net worth of approxi-
mately $9 million. Id.
69 The difference between the outcomes in Yaffe and BBT reflects a general pattern in
the decisions addressing good faith: courts are usually more willing to dismiss for bad faith
when the debtor is a real-estate enterprise. This can be explained by the nature of the good
faith inquiry, which focuses on whether the debtor "merits" the fresh start a reorganization
is thought to provide. Because real-estate enterprises typically have few employees or trade
creditors, they fail to raise concerns about the impact of a liquidation on third parties.
Thus, courts are probably less bothered by requiring that secured creditors of real-estate
enterprises be assured the full benefit of their bargain outside of bankruptcy. Although this
explains the exceptional treatment of real-estate enterprises, courts do not openly reason in
this way.
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C. Substantive Effects of Bankruptcy Rules and the Collective
Proceeding
Debtors sometimes seek to enter bankruptcy in order to take
advantage of certain substantive rules. The issues in such cases are
illustrated by the recent dispute over the legitimacy of Johns-
Manville's bankruptcy filing.70 This Fortune 500 corporation, with
a net worth (exclusive of tort liability) of approximately $1.1 bil-
lion at the time of filing,7 1 filed a chapter 11 petition alleging that
its future tort liability, resulting from the manufacture of asbestos
products, would exceed its net worth. The immediate problem, ac-
cording to Johns-Manville, stemmed from an accounting rule re-
quiring it to establish a reserve of at least $1.9 billion to cover this
future liability, which in turn would have triggered the acceleration
of approximately $450 million of outstanding debt, thus forcing
liquidation of the company.72 Attorneys representing members of
the affected class of plaintiffs moved to dismiss the petition, citing
Johns-Manville's alleged "lack of good faith in filing its petition,"
70 On the Johns-Manville issue, see Phillips, Asbestos Litigation: The Test of the Tort
System, 36 ARK. L. REv. 343, 356-57 (1982) (use of bankruptcy by asbestos companies "prob-
lematical"; suggests the purpose of the petition is to delay and inconvenience tort claim-
ants); Note, Escape from Debtor's Prison: The Manville Reorganization, 48 ALB. L. REv.
1045, 1056-57 (1984) (favoring Johns-Manville's use of chapter 11 and suggesting that the
"good faith" doctrine has not been violated) [hereinafter cited as Note, The Manville Reor-
ganization]; Note, Who Will Compensate the Victims of Asbestos-Related Diseases?
Manville's Chapter 11 Fuels the Fire, 14 ENvTL. L. 465, 466, 479-80, 487, 489-91 (1984)
(Johns-Manville's filing raises the specter of other financially successful debtors using bank-
ruptcy to limit liability; Congress should consider reforming the bankruptcy law to foreclose
use of bankruptcy by solvent companies); Note, The Manville Bankruptcy: Treating Mass
Tort Claims in Chapter 11 Proceedings, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1121, 1122-28 (1983) (Johns-
Manville is attempting to limit the aggregate size of current and future liability through
bankruptcy; this use is appropriate only where it is more likely than not that the corpora-
tion will be rendered insolvent as a result of these claims); Note, Manville: Good Faith
Reorganization or "Insulated" Bankruptcy, 12 HosTRA L. REv. 121, 129-36, 150-52 (1983)
(if potential tort claimants have a "claim" under the Code, Johns-Manville should be enti-
tled to protection of the bankruptcy laws); Comment, The Manville Corporate Bankruptcy:
An Abuse of the Judicial Process?, 11 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 151, 184 (1983) (Johns-Manville's
use of bankruptcy "dubious" but not an abuse of the law as it now stands); Comment, Relief
from Tort Liability Through Reorganization, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 1227, 1238, 1247 (1983)
(mere showing that Johns-Manville is currently solvent not enough to establish bad faith,
but court should dismiss if there is evidence that firm does not "need" bankruptcy and
instead is using it to limit its liability) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Relief from Tort
Liability]; Comment, Manville Corporation and the "Good Faith" Standard for Reorgani-
zation Under the Bankruptcy Code, 14 U. TOL. L. REv. 1467, 1468-70, 1474-1506 (1983)
(arguing, on the basis of the good faith standard under both the Act and the Code, that
Johns-Manville filed in bad faith).
71 See Note, The Manville Reorganization, supra note 70, at 1045-46 (citing affidavits
by Johns-Manville officers).
72 In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 Bankr. 727, 730 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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and contending that Johns-Manville "perpetrated a fraud" on the
court.73 The plaintiffs claimed that Johns-Manville entered bank-
ruptcy in order to limit its liability to creditors, including asbestos
victims.7 4
The issue in the Johns-Manville case, said the court, was
whether "even egregious error, in overcalculation of Manville's fi-
nancial problems, [is] relevant to establish the kind of bad faith in
the sense of an abuse of this Court's jurisdiction which will vitiate
the filing of a Chapter 11 petition.715 The court began by noting
the absence of an insolvency requirement under the Code, 6 but
then added an important gloss: "the drafters of the Code envi-
sioned that a financially beleaguered debtor with real debt and
real creditors should not be required to wait until the economic
situation is beyond repair in order to file a reorganization peti-
tion. 7 7 While neither the language of the Code nor its legislative
history authorizes an examination of the debtor's financial status,7 8
the court incorporated just such an inquiry into its examination of
the debtor's good faith. The court stated that good faith is not a
"strict and absolute . . . predicate to filing," and observed that the
good faith requirement in the old Bankruptcy Act had been de-
leted from the Code.79 Nevertheless it is an "elastic" concept
"which can be read into the statute on a limited ad hoc basis,"80 a
proposition for which the court cited its own opinion in In re Eden
Associates, where it had stated that "[iun determining a lack of
good faith, the court should emphasize the intent to abuse the ju-
73 Id. The affected class of plaintiffs consisted of those victims who had been exposed
to asbestos and had manifested symptoms of asbestos-related diseases. Given the limited
pool of assets from which claims could be satisfied, the interests of this class differed from
those victims who had been exposed to asbestos but who had not yet manifested any asbes-
tos-related symptoms. The narrow bankruptcy question was whether the members of this
latter group have a "claim" as that word is defined in the Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101(4) (1982).
That question is beyond the scope of this comment; for a good general discussion of the
issues, see Roe, Bankruptcy and Mass Tort, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 846, 892-904 (1984).
74 In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 Bankr. 727, 730 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984).
75 Id.
76 Id. at 732.
77 Id. at 736 (emphasis added).
78 See supra notes 3, 5; HousE REPORT, supra note 3, at 405, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 6361 ("[Section 1112(b)] brings together all of the conversion and dismissal
rules for chapter 11 cases.") (emphasis added); cf. Empire Enters. v. Koopmans (In re
Koopmans), 22 Bankr. 395, 403 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982) ("[In enacting the Code, it] was
necessary to coordinate the standards for dismissal with provisions for liquidation so that
vestiges of prior law, such as the good faith hearing, did not resurface to complicate realiza-
tion of the reform goal.").
79 36 Bankr. at 737.
8o Id. at 737.
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dicial process rather than to delay creditors."81 The court did not
explain what, other than hindering creditors in the exercise of their
rights, would constitute "abuse of the judicial process."
III. ANALYSIS
As the preceding discussion indicates, bankruptcy courts offer
no coherent rationale for a good faith requirement. This is not sur-
prising: because the motive of a debtor in filing for bankruptcy is
entirely irrelevant, such a justification cannot exist. In a collective
proceeding designed to sort out creditors' rights, the sole concern
of the bankruptcy court should be to distribute the estate's assets
in accordance with nonbankruptcy entitlements. If this is done
properly, creditors will have no need to attack the motives of a
debtor in filing a bankruptcy petition. Rather, they may directly
contest whether those nonbankruptcy entitlements are preserved.
The transfer-of-assets and adequate-protection cases that initially
gave rise to the imposition of a good faith requirement, and the
recent extension of this doctrine in the Johns-Manville bankruptcy
case, illustrate the way in which the good faith analysis offered by
the courts obscures the real issues.
A. Adequate Protection and Pre-Petition Transfers
Section 362 of the Code imposes an automatic stay on all col-
lection efforts by a debtor's creditors,s2 thus preventing the piece-
meal liquidation of the debtor.8 The stay remains in effect until
either the whole petition is dismissed8 4 or a secured creditor dem-
onstrates that it is not receiving "adequate protection."" Although
means of providing "adequate protection" are described in the
Code,' the Code does not expressly address the question of
whether such protection includes the time value of money.8 7 A
81 In re Eden Assocs., 13 Bankr. 578, 584 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981).
82 11 U.S.C.A. § 362 (West 1979 & Supp. 1985).
" See D. BAm & T. JACKSON, supra note 16, at 363.
8 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(c)(2) (West 1979 & Supp. 1985).
8- Id. § 362(d)(1).
86 The standard is illustrated rather than defined in section 361. Id. § 361. In order to
compensate the secured creditor for the denial of its right to foreclosure, the court may
order the debtor to give the secured creditor cash payments that compensate it for any
decrease in the value of the creditor's interest in the property, id. § 361(1), or additional
liens compensating for the same, id. § 361(2), or any "other relief" that results in the credi-
tor receiving the "indubitable equivalent" of its property interest, id. § 361(3).
8' See Comment, Compensation for Time Value as Part of Adequate Protection Dur-
ing the Automatic Stay in Bankruptcy, 50 U. CHL L. RE V. 305, 307, 319 (1983). Those as-
serting that the Code does not require time-value compensation point to the following pas-
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compelling construction of the statute finds that Congress in-
tended secured creditors to receive the time value of money.8 The
normative justification for such a conclusion, which is provided by
the creditors' bargain model, 9 lays bare the problem created by
imposing a good faith requirement.
In theory, secured creditors should be indifferent to the filing
of a bankruptcy petition.90 Yet, in nearly every transfer and feasi-
bility case raising the good faith issue, the party objecting to the
petition is a secured creditor."1 This departure from theoretical ex-
pectations indicates that, in practice, courts are applying bank-
ruptcy rules that diverge from the rules for which creditors would
bargain. It is obvious that if the secured creditor is not indifferent
sage in the Code's legislative history.
The . . . means of providing adequate protection.... are neither exclusive nor ex-
haustive. . . . It is expected that the courts will apply the concept in light of facts of
each case and general equitable principles. . . . There are an infinite number of varia-
tions possible in dealings between debtors and credtors, [sic] the law is continually
developing and new ideas are continually being implemented .. .. The flexibility is
important to permit courts to adapt to varying circumstances and changing modes of
financing.
HOUSE REPORT. supra note 3, at 339, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6295, quoted in
Nimmer, Secured Creditors, supra note 11, at 16-17. In contrast, those asserting that ade-
quate protection requires time-value compensation point to the statement, made in the
course of the same discussion, that "[s]ecured creditors should not be deprived of the bene-
fit of their bargain." HousE REPORT, supra note 3, at 339, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
at 6295. The bargain made by a secured creditor is not limited to the receipt of a sum
certain (the value of the collateral), but the receipt of that sum at a certain
time-specifically, when the right of foreclosure arises and the creditor could dispose of the
property and reinvest the money received at prevailing market rates. See Baird & Jackson,
supra note 13, at 115, 128; Comment, supra, at 312. Because the legislative history can
plausibly be read to encompass either view, it is fair to conclude that Congress left the
question of what constitutes adequate protection to be decided by courts on a case-by-case
basis. Recent Supreme Court decisions support the position that courts must look to
nonbankruptcy entitlements to determine what rights a party to a bankruptcy proceeding
has, at least where Congress has left the question to the courts. See Commodity Futures
Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 105 S. Ct. 1986, 1992-93 (1985); Butner v. United States,
440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979). Since, outside of bankruptcy, secured creditors could foreclose on the
collateral, sell it, and reinvest the proceeds at the market rate of interest, bankruptcy law
should give secured creditors time-value compensation-the compensation most closely
analogous to the secured creditor's nonbankruptcy entitlements. Cf. Weintraub, 105 S. Ct.
at 1293 (analogizing to nonbankruptcy law to determine whether trustee may waive corpo-
rate debtor's attorney-client privilege); Comment, supra note 25, at 1249-57 (same).
See Comment, supra note 87.
See supra notes 12-28 and accompanying text.
o See supra text accompanying notes 26-28.
"I See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 35, 38, 54 & 57. The few cases in which an un-
secured creditor raises a good faith objection usually involve only one or two major credi-
tors, a situation in which the collective proceeding of bankruptcy is not especially useful.
See, e.g., In re Mogul, 17 Bankr. 680 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982); In re Horizon Hospital, Inc.,
10 Bankr. 672 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981).
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to whether a bankruptcy proceeding is commenced, then the se-
cured creditor must expect that it will be undercompensated in the
bankruptcy forum. In short, although the secured creditor formu-
lates its objections in terms of good faith, the secured creditor
probably is not concerned about the debtor's motivation in filing a
bankruptcy petition. The complaints of the secured creditor can
only be a reflection of the reduced value it expects to receive in
bankruptcy.92
Secured creditors object to bankruptcy petitions because
bankruptcy courts do not grant the adequate protection required
by the Code and predicted by the creditors' bargain model. Bank-
ruptcy courts have consistently refused to grant secured creditors
the time value of their investment.93 Moreover, the courts tend to
overestimate the value of the secured creditor's collateral. 4
Through such overvaluation, the courts are led to assert that the
collateral fully protects the secured creditor's claim when, in fact,
it does not.9 5 These valuation problems result from the actions of
courts, not of debtors; to decide the questions created by these val-
uation problems in terms of the debtor's good faith is to miss the
point.
The failure to provide truly adequate protection to secured
creditors pervades bankruptcy proceedings.98 In many instances,
courts simply will not listen to the argument that the secured cred-
itor is undercompensated for the time value of its investment.
Courts recognize that there is a problem only in the extreme case
91 See Jackson, supra note 12, at 874-77.
9 See, e.g., Crocker Nat'l Bank v. American Mariner Indus. (In re American Mariner
Indus.), 27 Bankr. 1004, 1009 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1983) ("[Tlhere is no expression [in the
Code's legislative history] of an intent to compensate the secured party for the delay in its
potential to realize a profit from a more lucrative investment of the funds which could be
generated from a successful sale of the collateral to a third party."), rev'd, 734 F.2d 426 (9th
Cir. 1984); General Elec. Mortgage Corp. v. South Village, Inc. (In re South Village, Inc.), 25
Bankr. 987, 989-1002 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982) (adequate protection read as including time-
value compensation is inconsistent with the Code's alternative formulation of the means of
providing it, the equitable case-by-case approach adopted in the legislative history, and
other sections of the Code); In re Pine Lake Village Apartment Co., 19 Bankr. 819, 827
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("Adequate protection relates to preservation of the collateral value,
and not to compensation for the loss of a better business opportunity.").
9 See Baird & Jackson, supra note 13, at 126-27 & n.91 (citing examples from cases);
Blum, The Law and Language of Corporate Reorganizations, 17 U. CHL L. REv. 565, 577-78
& n.18 (1950); Jackson, supra note 12, at 874-77.
95 See, e.g., In re Nite Lite Inns, 17 Bankr. 367, 373 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1982) (rejecting,
as an "artificial and unrealistic burden on [the] debtor['s attempt] to reorganize," the credi-
tor's contention that the note it received should reflect the 40-50% discount a bank would
set in converting the note to cash).
" See Baird & Jackson, supra note 13, at 98-99.
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where the debtor has obviously filed for bankruptcy solely to pre-
serve the benefit, but not the responsibilities, of an earlier bargain
struck with the creditor-thus obtaining a windfall at the expense
of the secured creditor.9 7
In both the change-of-form and the transfer-of-assets cases,
the lack of adequate protection is complicated by the fact that
debtors are attempting to escape from the bright-line rule, pro-
vided by the Code, that determines which debtors are eligible for a
collective proceeding. By confining eligible debtors to "business
trusts" and the like, Congress attempted to isolate those debtors in
which a large number of parties have an ownership interest and
thus are likely to require a collective proceeding to sort out claims
against the estate.9 s Cases in which ineligible debtors attempt to
make use of the bankruptcy forum demonstrate that entities
outside the statutory definition of eligible debtors, like land trusts,
often require collective proceedings to sort 'out the rights of own-
ers. But changes of form or transfers of assets to eligible entities
would not be resisted by secured creditors if courts provided the
adequate protection required by the Code. In fact, creditors would
desire collective proceedings for the efficiencies they create.99
When adequate protection is likely to be absent, however, and se-
cured creditors challenge the petition, courts have analyzed the
change of form or transfer of assets in terms of good faith even
though the transaction itself may be beneficial in enhancing the
value of the estate as a whole.100 This undesirable result can only
See, e.g., Yaffe v. Andrews (In re Andrews), 17 Bankr. 515 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1982)
(bad faith use of bankruptcy to preserve a low interest loan); In re Victory Constr. Co., 9
Bankr. 549 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1981) (same).
98 See, e.g., In re Treasure Island Land Trust, 2 Bankr. 332, 334 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1980) ("The basic distinction between business trusts and nonbusiness trusts is that busi-
ness trusts are created for the purpose of carrying on some kind of business or commercial
activity for profit; the object of a nonbusiness trust is to protect and preserve the trust
res."); see also In re Dreske Greenway Trust, 14 Bankr. 618, 622 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1981)
(rejecting the creditor's contention that the debtor was an ineligible trust because the trust
instruments specifically contemplated the use of the trust assets in forming and running a
business).
" See supra text accompanying notes 19-23; text following note 25.
100 Courts have analyzed transfer and change-of-form cases under the good faith doc-
trine as if they were looking for "sham" transactions. This inquiry misunderstands the pur-
pose of the eligible-debtor provisions of the Code, which is to enumerate the classes of cases
in which a collective proceeding is usually necessary. Contrary to the viewpoint of the courts
as evidenced by their good faith analyses, Congress's intent is not frustrated by either a
change in corporate form or the transfer of assets to an eligible debtor so long as there are
multiple parties claiming an ownership interest in the debtor's assets. If there are multiple
parties, then bankruptcy's collective proceeding is an effective mechanism for maximizing
the estate's assets. See supra notes 15-23, 33 and accompanying text. If, however, courts fail
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be caused by the legitimate fears of secured creditors.
B. Extension to New Areas
The good faith inquiry initially arose in cases where the real
issue was adequate protection. Perhaps because the good faith in-
quiry has never been related to the underlying problem-failure to
apply the requirements of the Code properly-and because the ap-
proach lacks any theoretical justification, courts have begun to ap-
ply it in other areas. In cases where courts have applied the good
faith requirement to debtors that allegedly file for bankruptcy
merely to take advantage of the substantive effects of bankruptcy
rules, no issue of adequate protection is involved.10 1 In these cases,
one party seeks to invoke good faith to force dismissal of the peti-
tion because it enjoys a superior strategic position outside of bank-
ruptcy. Again, however, by focusing on the debtor's motive, courts
have missed the core issue: whether there exists a real need for a
collective proceeding or whether, on the contrary, a party is at-
tempting to take advantage of a more attractive bankruptcy
rule.10 2
to provide secured creditors with time-value compensation, debtors will have an incentive to
enter bankruptcy in order to take advantage of the more favorable bankruptcy rule-a rule
that transfers wealth from secured creditor to debtor by allowing the debtor to continue to
use the assets interest free. See supra note 28. This strategic behavior is a reflection of the
perverse incentives created by the courts' failure to give secured creditors the time value of
their investments; the courts' good faith analysis of the debtor's transaction fails to confront
this problem.
101 In cases like Johns-Manville, creditors have raised good faith challenges based
upon allegations that the debtor has filed a petition not to take advantage of the efficiencies
provided by bankruptcy's collective proceeding but rather to take advantage of a change in
substantive rights in bankruptcy from the nonbankruptcy norm. In this sense, the adequate-
protection cases and cases like Johns-Manville share a common characteristic: both groups
of cases result from what debtors perceive as more advantageous substantive rights in bank-
ruptcy. The point of distinction between the two groups of cases is that the adequate pro-
tection problem stems from the improper implementation of bankruptcy rules, while cases
like Johns-Manville result from changes in substantive rights needed to bring about a col-
lective proceeding. The appropriate inquiry in cases like Johns-Manville is whether the
owners of the corporation will benefit from a collective proceeding. If not, the petition
should be dismissed. If the owners will not benefit from a collective proceeding, the most
likely motivation for the filing is to take advantage of a change in substantive rights. None-
theless, the inquiry as to whether the debtor is in need of a collective proceeding is an
objective one; it does not turn on the actual motives of the debtor. The good faith inquiry
relies precisely upon this factor.
101 Another example of the problem is the alleged abuse of bankruptcy to reject collec-
tive-bargaining agreements. Prior to the adoption of 11 U.S.C.A. § 1113 (West Supp. 1985),
labor unions commonly complained that employers had entered bankruptcy solely in order
to use the power under section 365(a) to reject collective-bargaining agreements as execu-
tory contracts. See, e.g., Local Union 20 v. Brada Miller Freight Sys., Inc. (In re Brada
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In Johns-Manville, for example, the petition demonstrated a
need for a collective proceeding. The company's future liability
(discounted to present value) clearly exceeded the value of its as-
sets, and the company had a multitude of investors.103 Absent a
bankruptcy petition, individual creditors would have obtained exe-
cution judgments against Johns-Manville, eventually "forcing the
piecemeal liquidation of the company." 4 The very purpose of a
bankruptcy reorganization is to prevent such results. The real rea-
son behind the good faith objection was the nature of the com-
pany's future liabilities. Most of these liabilities were in the form
of potential claims by those persons who had been exposed to as-
bestos but were not yet aware that they had contracted asbesto-
sis.105 Inside a collective proceeding, the interests of these contin-
gent creditors must be taken into account.106  Outside of
bankruptcy, however, tort claimants with known present injuries
have a strategic advantage over other potential claimants: they can
pursue their claims first and have them satisfied in full. Instead of
confronting this strategic behavior, the court engaged in the un-
helpful good faith analysis.
The issue was not whether Johns-Manville had "real" debts
and whether the bankruptcy court should apply its ad hoc good
faith test, but rather whether the company's financial difficulties
were so severe that a collective proceeding would have been in the
best interests of all of Johns-Manville's creditors. Moreover, even
under the courts' own good faith inquiry, it is difficult to under-
stand how the company could have filed for bankruptcy in "bad
faith": Johns-Manville's equityholders would not receive anything
more within the bankruptcy forum than they would have received
outside of bankruptcy unless the bankruptcy court undervalued
the claims of creditors, including future tort claimants.07 Even if
Miller Freight Sys., Inc.), 702 F.2d 890, 901 (11th Cir. 1983); In re Continental Airlines
Corp., 38 Bankr. 67, 71 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1984); In re Braniff Airways, Inc., 25 Bankr. 216,
218 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982). In NLRB v. Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. 1188, 1196 (1984), the Su-
preme Court resolved the issue by permitting rejection of such contracts under a "burden-
some to the estate" standard, and Congress essentially codified this standard in section
1113. Here, in stark contrast to other areas in which the good faith problem has arisen, a
rather open-ended, equitable inquiry has been expressly authorized by Congress and is re-
quired by the inherent tension between national labor policy and the bankruptcy system.
103 In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 Bankr. 727, 730 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984).
104 Id. at 730, 740.
105 Id. at 740.
106 See D. BARD & T. JACKSON, supra note 16, at 219-22.
107 Cf. Note, The Manville Reorganization, supra note 70, at 1070-71 ("If the asbestos
claimants' unsecured debt is valued in astronomical amounts, management must accept con-
firmation of a plan that cancels the interests of present shareholders, something it certainly
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the prospects of undervaluation prompted Johns-Manville to file
for bankruptcy, the good faith inquiry is useless in resolving the
underlying valuation issue.
CONCLUSION
Courts and commentators have eagerly embraced a good faith
requirement under current bankruptcy law despite the fact that a
similar requirement was deliberately eliminated from the old
Bankruptcy Act. Unfortunately, proponents of a good faith re-
quirement have failed to consider the appropriateness of such a
requirement in light of the normative framework of bankruptcy.
The use of an ambiguous equitable doctrine avoids the harder and
more important issues: the proper definition of "adequate protec-
tion" and the appropriate uses of bankruptcy as a collective pro-
ceeding. Courts should abandon the good faith doctrine and face
up to the real problems it obscures.
Daniel J. Tyukody, Jr.
will not do placidly... A necessary query follows: why then is Manville invoking Chapter
11?"); Roe, supra note 73, at 863 ("There is ... a biblical irony in the result to which we
are driven if we combine the principles of debtor rehabilitation, equality among creditors
(including tort claimants), and priority of creditors (including tort claimants) over owners.
Telescoping future claims into an early reorganization makes the mass tort victims of a
firm's misdeeds the firm's owners.").
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